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I. ABSTRACT
Rights are, without a doubt, the most outstanding feature of
contemporary legal systems. It can be argued that since the middle
of the past century we are immersed in a culture of rights. Neoconstitutionalism is one among other such concepts that has been
used to designate and study this phenomenon. The hypothesis we
will attempt to address in this paper is that some of the central
characters of our culture of rights, here termed as “neoconstitutionalism,” cannot be explained consistently without an
explicit reference to natural law.
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We will specifically examine the connection between the
assertion that there exist natural law principles of justice and the
following characteristics of our culture of rights: a) the recognition
of rights; b) the reference of state or national legal systems to
supranational legal systems; c) constitutions as a result of a
network of principles and rules; d) the principle of proportionality;
and e) the principle of reasonableness. While the first three
characteristics constitute the structure of any neo-constitutional
practice, the two latter ones are features of the processes of legal
reception and legal allocation of rights in such a legal practice.
This paper aims to show that, ultimately, identifying, explaining,
and understanding each and all of these five characteristics of
contemporary legal culture depends upon the existence of a
normative resort that goes beyond the legal culture itself.
II. INTRODUCTION
The recognition of human rights is, without a doubt, the most
outstanding feature of contemporary legal systems. It can be
argued that since the middle of the past century we are immersed
in a culture of rights. Neo-constitutionalism is one among many
concepts that has been used to designate and study this
phenomenon. The hypothesis we will address in this paper is that
some of the central characters of our culture of rights, here referred
to as “neo-constitutionalism,” cannot be explained consistently
without a reference to natural law.
In order to highlight this general statement, I will address today
the conceptual connection between natural law and the following
features of neo-constitutional practices: a) the recognition of rights;
b) the relationship between state legal systems and supra-state
legal systems; c) constitutions resulting from a framework of
principles and rules; d) the principle of proportionality; and e) the
principle of reasonableness.
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The first three features are dimensions to the overall structure
of neo-constitutional states, while the two latter are features of the
legal determination and judicial enforcement of human rights. This
paper aims to show that identifying, explaining, and understanding
each and all of these five characteristics of contemporary legal
culture depends upon the existence of a normative instance which
is beyond the legal culture itself.
III. RIGHTS AND THEIR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
In an article written thirty years ago, Javier Hervada made
some observations that, with the passage of time, have gained
interest. 1 Hervada noted that: a) the whole of the International
Conventions, Declarations and Treaties on human rights explicitly
stated that they “acknowledged” or “recognized” the rights there
enumerated, and b) that this explicit “recognition” posed
“problems” for the philosophy of law of his time. Hervada was
correct in both cases. First, human rights are acknowledged, as is
shown in the explicit language used in all legal texts concerning
them. This language aims at distinguishing these rights from other
kind of rights, whose proximate ground or root is the fact that a
competent legal authority has made a decision. Secondly, Hervada
maintained that this language of “recognition” posed problems for
the philosophy of law, especially for legal positivism which was
widely present in Spanish legal philosophy at the moment in which
that article was written. If, as positivism asserts, law is
fundamentally and exclusively positive law, and if the obligatory
nature of positive law is fully based upon its mere existence as a
social practice, then there is no room for pre-existing rights. The
whole of positive law and therefore of positive rights would be the
product of the choice of the person or of the group of persons

1. Javier Hervada, Problemas que una nota esencial de los derechos
humanos plantea a la filosofía del derecho, 9 PERSONA Y DERECHO 243, 256
(1982).
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socially empowered with the authority to do so, with no further
limit than their imagination.
Therefore, if the positivist approach to the study of law was the
only one possible, we would be forced to choose between two
alternatives: a) either the assimilation of human rights to positive
rights, which is a conceptual contradiction; b) or the assertion that
rights are pure fiction and cannot be rationally based. Both ways
pose multiple difficulties which cannot be discussed here. 2 Yet, it
is worth noticing the existence of an alternative solution, consisting
in connecting the concept of human rights with basic human
good, 3 and simultaneously preserving the determinative or positive
dimension of human rights law (both in the area of legislation as
well as in the adjudication process).
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL SCOPE OF THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND
PROTECTION OF RIGHTS
In the last thirty years, we have witnessed a process of
recognition, promotion, and protection of human rights, both
within the boundaries of national states and in the international
field. Although these national and international processes are
generally converging movements, they sometimes conflict between
each other. What should be done when these conflicts emerge?
Which of the two should take preeminence? Three answers have
been set forth in the history of public international law: for national
monism, priority is given to state law; for international monism, on
the other hand, priority is given to international law; whereas, with
dualism, each system has its own independent criteria for validity
or recognition.
2. PEDRO
SERNA
BERMÚDEZ,
POSITIVISMO
FUNDAMENTACIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS (EUNSA

CONCEPTUAL

Y

1990); Pedro Serna
Bermúdez, El derecho a la vida en el horizonte cultural europeo de fin de siglo
in EL DERECHO A LA VIDA 79 (Carlos I. Massini Correas & Pedro Serna eds.,
EUNSA 1998).
3. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 59 (2d ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 2011).
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In the case of Argentina, those who support state monism
usually cite two texts from the Constitution itself to support their
stance: article 27, which establishes that international agreements
should conform to constitutional public law principles, and article
31, which refers to the “Supreme Law of the Nation,” and states its
content in the following order: “this Constitution, the laws of the
Nation that in its consequence are dictated by Congress, and the
treaties with foreign powers.” 4
Those advocating for the other two perspectives, international
monism or dualism, argue on the basis of international law texts.
For example, they look at the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which establishes in article 27 that “a party may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its
failure to perform a treaty.” 5As Carlos Nino accurately noticed,
“the interesting thing about this controversy is that both positions
are completely circular, since those who defend the priority of the
constitution support their arguments by the constitution itself, and
those who defend the precedence of international conventions
support their arguments by international conventions.” 6 This
shows, the author continues, “that the validity of a specific legal
system cannot be founded on rules coming from that same legal
system, but should instead be derived from principles which are
external to the system. Judges or legislators debating these monist
or dualist positions, therefore, cannot flee from extra-legal
principles of a moral nature in the wider sense in order to support
their positions.” 7 While monism will accentuate sovereignty,
dualism in its two variations would prefer to emphasize the
4. Art. 27 and art. 31, Const. Arg. (author’s translation), available at:
http://www1.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dip/congreso/Constitucion%20sola.pdf.
5. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/Conf.39/27;
1155 UNTS 331; 8 ILM 679 (1969); 63 AJIL 875 (1969); available at:
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1980/01/19800127%2000-52%20AM/Ch
_XXIII_01p.pdf.
6. CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, DERECHO, MORAL Y POLÍTICA. UNA REVISIÓN
DE LA TEORÍA GENERAL DEL DERECHO 62 (Ariel 1994).
7. Id. at 62.
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universality of rights. This allows for concluding that neoconstitutional legal systems do not provide for a “closed system of
justifiable solutions.” 8
V. RIGHTS AND IUS-FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
The constitutionalist and philosopher of law Ronald Dworkin,
towards the end of the 1960s, brought to everyone’s attention the
fact that the United States’ legal system enclosed two categories of
norms: principles and rules. 9 According to Dworkin, the positivist
approach to the study of law had concentrated its analysis on the
rules, without taking into sufficient account the existence of
principles, nor the role they played within constitutional legal
practices. This deficient attention to principles strongly
conditioned, in his opinion, the plausibility of the description of
law proposed by the work of Herbert Hart and his followers. 10
The main argument posed by Dworkin against Hart was that
the rule of recognition, proposed by Hart as criteria for identifying
valid positive law and distinguishing it from other normative
systems, was incapable of detecting principles, whose existence in
a legal system like the North American one is unquestionable. This
is because the existence of principles within legal systems is not
primarily grounded on the fact of their having been positively or
explicitly acknowledged by legal institutions but, instead, on the
fact of having been recognized by these same institutions as
“intrinsically reasonable,” using an expression coined by Joseph
Esser. 11
Avoiding the further and divergent debates raised by this line
of reasoning, especially after the publication of Hart’s most famous
8. Id.
9. Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 46
(1967), reprinted in DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (Harvard Univ.
Press 1977).
10. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 1961).
11. JOSEF ESSER, PRINCIPIO Y NORMA EN LA ELABORACIÓN
JURISPRUDENCIAL DEL DERECHO PRIVADO 87 (Eduardo Valentí Fiol trans.,
Bosch 1961).
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work, Postscriptum, 12 the truth is that the acceptance of
“intrinsically reasonable” principles only makes sense if these refer
to (that is to say, have as reference) goods whose character, as
such, does not depend upon the legislator or judge who applies the
principles. 13 In other words, the presence of principles with these
characteristics can only be explained through references to realities
that exist beyond the scope of the positive law which
acknowledges them and the constant effort of interpreting them
according to the specific case at hand.
VI. THE JUSTIFICATION AND THE SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY
The recognition of human rights in constitutions (as
fundamental rights or constitutional rights) has gone hand in hand
with the spread of the practice known as “judicial review.” The
latter is a creation of the United States Supreme Court, which
allocates to judges the power to invalidate laws which they deem
contrary to constitutional rights. While not denying the existence
of important differences with that which different constitutional
systems have previously incorporated, it cannot be questioned that
judicial review is present in every constitutional practice. 14
Now then, how is this judicial review put into practice? In
other words: how do judges determine that the statutory regulation
of a fundamental or constitutional right violates what has been
established as lawful in the constitution? Constitutional Law
practice has responded to these questions with the principle of

12. Published posthumously in the second edition of Hart’s THE CONCEPT
LAW; see Scott J. Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for
the Perplexed, Univ. of Michigan, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper
Series, No. 77 (2007), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=968657 and
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.968657.
13. See Carlos I. Massini Correas, Razón práctica y objetividad del
Derecho. El debate contemporáneo acerca de los principios jurídicos, 64
SAPIENTIA 224-41 (2004).
14. Juan Cianciardo, The Principle of Proportionality: The Challenges of
Human Rights, 3 J. CIV. L. STUD. 177-86 (2010).
OF
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proportionality. 15 According to this principle, a statutory norm is
considered constitutional if it suits three sub-principles: a) it should
be adequate and therefore capable of producing its own point or
end (sub-principle of adaptation); b) it should be necessary and,
therefore, the least restrictive of the equally efficient ones (subprinciple of necessity); c) lastly, it should be proportional stricto
sensu, that is to say, it should express a proportionate deliberation
concerning the benefits and prejudices which might result from the
enforcement of the norm.
The principle of proportionality refers without a doubt to
evaluative instances that are situated beyond the domain of both
the text of the norms under constitutional control, and the text of
the constitution itself. This reference to a meta-positive instance is
shown, at least, in the following two items: first, in the grounds for
justifying the principle itself. Why is proportionality or
reasonableness a constitutional principle? How are we to justify
this constitutional requirement? Except at the cost of circularity,
this question cannot be answered from the perspective of the
constitution in question. Second, it becomes apparent in each of the
sub-principles that frame the principle, since all of them refer to
endsalthough from perspectives that do not entirely
coincidewhose determination cannot be reduced to an internal
analysis of the norms.
VII. THE JUSTIFICATION AND CONTENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
REASONABLENESS
A second feature of the dynamics of the “culture of rights” in
which we are immersed is the principle of reasonableness. In the
19th century, the dominant trend concerning the description of
legal interpretation was “legal formalism.” This, in a very short
15. ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 69, 414 (Julian
Rivers trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002); see also CARLOS BERNAL PULIDO, EL
PRINCIPIO DE PROPORCIONALIDAD Y LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES (Centro de
Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales 2003).
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synthesis, could be described as a theory which attempts to reduce
the adjudication of law to deductive logic. In the 20th century,
however, it was soon perceived that in order to establish the facts
in each of the cases a judge must resolve and determine the
applicable norms, requiring a decision to be made between various
alternatives that are, prima facie, formally correct. 16
In effect, legal operators are compelled, on the one hand, to reconstruct the facts in a case, and this implies choosing: a) the
legally relevant facts within a framework of facts, b) the legal
means of evidence, and c) the most convincing evidence. On the
other hand, judges and lawyers are faced with the need to: a)
choose the applicable norms, b) choose the method or methods of
interpretation with which they will apply the norms, and c) choose
the results towards which these methods of interpretation lead. 17
These factual and normative choices raise the obvious question
about the right criteria according to which they should be decided.
While legal theories in the past century oscillated between, on the
one hand, the practical conflation between discretion and
unreasonableness, 18 and, on the other hand, the practical negation
of discretion or reasonableness, 19 comparative constitutional
analysis has come gradually to answer this question with the
principle of reasonableness, as a counterpart to arbitrariness,
expressly proscribed by some constitutions, as is the case, for
example, of article 9.3 of the Spanish Constitution. 20
16. See ALEKSANDER PECZENIK, ON LAW AND REASON (2d ed., Springer
2009).
17. In effect, “the notion of ‘reasonable’ is also used . . . at every stage of
judicial reasoning: the determination of the facts, the qualification and
interpretation of the applicable laws, the use of various rhetorical and logical
formulas.” Oliver Corten, The Notion of “Reasonable” in International Law:
Legal Discourse, Reason and Contradictions, 48 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 613
(1999).
18. HANS KELSEN, TEORÍA PURA DEL DERECHO 353 (2d ed., Porrúa 1993).
19. Dworkin, supra note 9.
20. Article 9.3 of the Spanish Constitution states:
The Constitution guarantees the principle of legality, the hierarchy of
legal provisions, the publicity of legal statutes, the non-retroactivity of
punitive provisions that are not favorable to or restrictive of individual
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In accordance with this principle, each and all of the decisions
taken by a legal operator must demonstrably surpass the test of
“reasonableness.” This means that a legal operator is obliged to
give reasons and, particularly, to justify the reason for choosing a
certain path from all the alternatives he is faced with. A decision
without motivation is considered unreasonable, arbitrary, and thus
a violation of the due process of law, or in the terms used in
European Constitutional Law, a violation of effective judicial
tutelage. 21
The justification and content of the principle of reasonableness
raises questions analogous to those posed by the principles of
proportionality: why reasonableness, and not the lack of
reasonableness? How does one justify the use of this principle?
Furthermore, which are the reasons that justify the establishment of
facts and the determination of norms, and what are the grounds for
these reasons? They cannot originate in the norms themselves
because, once again, this would be circular. In other words,
because the problem that must be dealt with consists of
determining that which is not already determined by the norms
themselves, the solution cannot lie in them but in something
outside them, although connected with them.
VIII. THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION: RIGHTS TAKEN SERIOUSLY
A few years ago, Robert Alexy explained that a normative
system is not a legal system unless it formulates a “claim of
correctness.” 22 This occurs when governmental authorities act with

rights, the certainty that the rule of law shall prevail, the accountability
of public authorities, and the prohibition of arbitrary action of public
authorities. (Author’s translation)
21. This allows the importance of the study of reasonability to be seen from
the very beginning of a lawyer’s training. See Suzanne R. Painter, Improving the
Teaching of School Law: A Call for Dialogue, 2001 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 213
(2001).
22. See ROBERT ALEXY, BEGRIFF UND GELTUNG DES RECHTS (The Concept
and Validity of the Law) (Karl Alber 2005); and Robert Alexy, On the Concept
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the assumption that what they are doing is correct, regardless of
whether it is actually entirely so. According to Alexy, when this
assumption is not formulated, and when those who govern only
take a personal or a class advantage with their power, practice of
the law does not amount to a legal system.
Yet it seems evident that not just any content allocated to that
which is assumed as correct will attain legality for a normative
system. For this reason, Alexy complements his thesis on
correctness with a reference to ius-fundamental principles. The
correctness of the assumption of a government’s actions is
basically expressed through its reference to fundamental rights.
What does this mean? When does a State recognize, identify,
protect, and promote rights? When does it put forth its “politics of
rights” as imposed by its constitution? 23 Or, in other words, how
can human rights be consistently conceptualized, indexed,
justified, and interpreted? In the preceding account, each of the
problems being dealt with has directly involved these questions.
The answer to such questions necessarily requires appealing to
instances beyond the legal texts where rights are recognized, as I
have attempted to demonstrate here in general terms.
It could be thought, together with Norberto Bobbio, that the
suggested element is a consensus, 24 in which the basis of human
rights could be found and the place where semantic indecisiveness
could be resolved when interpreting them. Yet there is an argument

and the Nature of Law, 21:3 RATIO JURIS 281,299 (2008). See also Eugenio
Bulygin, Alexy's Thesis of the Necessary Connection between Law and Morality,
13:2 RATIO JURIS 133, 137 (2000); and Robert Alexy, On the Thesis of a
Necessary Connection between Law and Morality: Bulygin's Critique, 13:2
RATIO JURIS 138,147 (2000).
23. ANTONIO-LUIS MARTÍNEZ PUJALTE, LA GARANTÍA DEL CONTENIDO
ESENCIAL DE LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES (Centro de Estudios
Constitucionales 1997).
24. Norberto Bobbio, El fundamento de los derechos humanos in
DICCIONARIO CRÍTICO DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS (Ramón Soriano Díaz,
Carlos Alarcón Cabrera & Juan Mora Molina dirs. and coords., Universidad
Internacional de Andalucía 2000).
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which destroys all the appeal of this alternative: human rights
discourse has been presented historically as the limit to what is
“able to be settled by agreement,” or to paraphrase the German
Constitutional Court, the “limit of limits” that consensus (including
democratic consensus) can legitimately impose upon the freedom
of human actions. 25 In other words, if the meaning of rights
depends on consensus, these rights are devoid of meaning. The
solution, thus, must be found elsewhere.
The question, however, is where? What has been presented
here so far supports the proposal of a possible answer that lies in
the following: all current legal systems formulate not one but two
assumptions. On the one hand, the claim to correctness as
postulated by Alexy, and on the other hand, a claim to moral
objectivity, found implicitly in the defense of principles. 26 Without
one or the other, the discourse of rights turns into self-reference
and, for this reason, becomes groundless and unintelligible. 27

25. See BVerfGE 19, 342, 348.
26. PILAR ZAMBRANO, LA INEVITABLE CREATIVIDAD EN LA
INTERPRETACIÓN JURÍDICA. UNA APROXIMACIÓN IUSFILOSÓFICA A LA TESIS DE
LA DISCRECIONALIDAD (UNAM 2009; published as no. 142 in the ESTUDIOS
JURIDICOS series).
27. As pointed out recently, it is noteworthy that the acceptance of the
presence of moral elements in legal reasoning by neo-constitutionalists and
inclusive positivists has not brought about further and more profound reflection
on moral objectivity. Above all, a negative response to this last question would
imply the negation of legal objectivity. See JUAN B. ETCHEVERRY, EL DEBATE
SOBRE EL POSITIVISMO JURÍDICO INCLUYENTE. UN ESTADO DE LA CUESTIÓN
(UNAM 2006), and ETCHEVERRY, OBJETIVIDAD Y DETERMINACIÓN DEL
DERECHO. UN DIÁLOGO CON LOS HEREDEROS DE HART (Comares 2008;
published as vol. 20 FILOSOFÍA, DERECHO & SOCIEDAD).

